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ANALYTICAL ESSAY
Comparative Exceptionalism: Universality
and Particularity in Foreign Policy Discourses
NICOLA NYMALM
The Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI)
AND
JOHANNES PLAGEMANN
GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies
Existing research on exceptionalism in foreign policy suggests a number
of confrontational features making it a threat to peaceful international
relations. Largely based on US and European cases, and hardly ever tak-
ing a comparative approach, this literature overlooks a variety of excep-
tionalisms in non-Western countries, including so called “rising powers”
such as China and India. A comparison between exceptionalist foreign
policy discourses of the United States, China, India, and Turkey shows that
exceptionalism is neither exclusive to the United States, nor a “new” phe-
nomenon within rising powers, nor necessarily confrontational, unilater-
alist, or exemptionalist. As a prerequisite for comparative work, we estab-
lish two features common to all exceptionalist foreign policy discourses.
In essence, such discourses are informed by supposedly universal values
derived from a particular civilization heritage or political history. In or-
der to systematize different versions of exceptionalism, we then propose
four ideal types, each of which reflects exceptionalism’s common trait of a
claim tomoral superiority and uniqueness but diverges across other impor-
tant dimensions, with implications for its potentially offensive character.
The article concludes by formulating a research agenda for future com-
parative work on exceptionalist foreign policy discourses and their reper-
cussions for great power relations and global politics.
Keywords: discourse, exceptionalism, foreign policy
Introduction1
A steady tradition in international relations (IR) scholarship studies and at-
tributes exceptionalism to the United States (US) as a particular characteristic
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informing and constituting its foreign policy (Cha 2015a; Lepgold and McKeown
1995; McCrisken 2003; McEvoy-Levy 2001; Restad 2012; Walt 2011).2 While Amer-
ican exceptionalism is not to be understood as a “unified body of thought,” it is
usually described along the lines of “an unwavering belief in the uniqueness of the
United States and a commitment to a providential mission to transform the rest of
the world in the image of the United States” (Nayak and Malone 2009, 260). Most
of these studies, especially contemporary ones on American exceptionalism since
the G. W. Bush presidency, suggest a number of confrontational features (Hodgson
2009; Monten 2005; Nabers 2009; Nayak and Malone 2009; Patman 2006; Wheeler
2003; Widmaier 2007). Consider Holsti’s definition of an exceptionalist foreign pol-
icy consisting of five criteria: a mission to “liberate” others in the pursuit of a uni-
versal “common good,” a sense of being free from external constraints, the need
to have an external enemy in a hostile world of “universal threats,” and perceiving
oneself as an innocent victim (Holsti 2010, 384, 394). Correspondingly, American
exceptionalism is often equated with unilateralism or even exemptionalism, namely
the belief that the United States is not bound by rules and norms governing the
“unexceptional rest.” Exemptionalism thus legitimizes the transgression of interna-
tional law, for example through interventions like the Iraq War in 2003 (Ruggie
2004).
Contemporary American exceptionalism has largely been read as informed by
both the historical belief in America’s exceptional character since the first puritan
settlements on the continent, as well as by its global superpower standing since the
end of WWII (Holsti 2010; McCrisken 2003; Onuf 2012). Regardless of whether the
United States is truly unique or not, to study American exceptionalism as constitu-
tive of US foreign policy is regarded as meaningful essentially because of these two
traits: the persistent prevalence of exceptionalist thinking in the United States, and
of US power abroad. It is therefore not surprising that so far the scant IR-literature
on exceptionalism in contemporary foreign policy beyond the United States has
mostly started to consider Chinese exceptionalism.3 Both the scholarly interest in,
and the articulation of a Chinese exceptionalism itself, are typically attributed to
China’s outstanding status as a “rising power” (Zhang 2011, 306; see also Callahan
2012, 50–51; Bradford and Posner 2011, 5; Wang 2015).
However, as we show in what follows, several other countries apart from the
United States (and China) do have a long history of exceptionalist discourses. These
foreign policy discourses have hardly ever been looked at comparatively, despite
both their family resemblance and relevance for debates on international politics
in a world composed of ever more self-confident foreign policy actors outside the
transatlantic orbit.4
The purpose of this article is to, first, engage in a comparative study of exception-
alism that draws attention to historical and contemporary exceptionalist foreign pol-
icy discourses beyond the United States and, second, debate their domestic sources
as well as repercussions for global politics. In contrast to the prevalent understand-
ing of US exceptionalism, we argue that exceptionalism is not confrontational, uni-
lateralist, or exemptionalist per se. Although not independent from the capacity to
2
In this article we focus on exceptionalist foreign policy discourses, not on commonly covered domestic features, such
as voter behavior, economic development, or state-society relations in the United States and elsewhere (Bengtsson et al.
2014; Prados de la Escosura 2004; Whitehead and Hoffmann 2007).
3
For an exception to the rule, see a recent piece on Russia’s “missionist exceptionalism” in foreign policy, including
a comparison with Israel, the United States, Serbia, and Poland (Humphreys 2016). As will be seen in later sections on
Turkey and India, there are several interesting studies on exceptionalism and foreign policy within individual countries,
none of which, however, systematically compares its findings to other cases.
4
In one of the few comparative pieces on exceptionalist foreign policy, Holsti questions the exceptionality of ex-
ceptionalism by conceptualizing it as a distinct type of foreign policy. Yet, in his article he compares the United States
only to the (historical) cases of postrevolutionary France and the Soviet Union, which makes his conclusion about the
exceptionality of US exceptionalism as lying in its longevity (2010, 400, 402) not entirely convincing.
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project (material and social) power abroad, we also challenge the assumption that
exceptionalism is only and naturally a feature of great or rising powers.
The article proceeds in four steps. First, by drawing from existing literature on ex-
ceptionalism in foreign policy, we propose criteria according to which one can com-
pare exceptionalist foreign policy discourses both within and across states. Here, we
engage in “concept reconstruction” (Sartori 1984, 41–50) with the aim of identi-
fying those elements of integral importance to a given concept (exceptionalism).
Whereas all exceptionalist discourses by definition refer to a certain (moral) supe-
riority that legitimates their foreign policy, they differ across two key dimensions:
Exceptionalisms are either of a missionary or exemplary character. Moreover, excep-
tionalist discourses can be either exemptionalist or nonexemptionalist. In a second step
we propose four ideal types of exceptionalism. Third, we illustrate our ideal types by
looking at exceptionalist foreign policy discourses in the United States, China, In-
dia, and Turkey. Fourth, we draw conclusions regarding exceptionalist foreign pol-
icy discourses concerning both their domestic sources and implications for global
politics. Finally, we delineate core elements of a future research agenda on compar-
ative exceptionalism.
Conceptualizing Exceptionalist Foreign Policy Discourse
We conceptualize exceptionalism as foreign policy discourse that is part of a soci-
ety’s debates around its identity as a nation. Exceptionalist discourse expresses a
paradoxical relationship between universality and particularity: the exceptionalist
state claims particular and exclusive access to the universal good—in terms of its
comprehension and the disposition to realize it beyond its own borders.
Exceptionalist discourse is articulated and enacted through states’ foreign pol-
icy. Accordingly, our notion of discourse encompasses linguistic and nonlinguistic
elements (Skonieczny 2001, 438), or “ideas and acting” (Holsti 2010, 382). Espe-
cially with regard to foreign policy statements, uttering them is practically enact-
ing foreign policy. Foreign policy discourse functions as a set of rules, structure, or
frame of intelligibility that is both constraining and enabling in that it makes cer-
tain courses of action necessary, desirable, and possible and others unacceptable
or inconceivable (Epstein 2010, 181). In other words, it implies engaging in some
types of external action and not others (Browning 2007, 28).
While we understand all exceptionalist discourses as a form of identity construc-
tion, not all identity construction is necessarily exceptionalist, nor do we find excep-
tionalist elements in every country’s foreign policy discourse (see below). Although
certain kinds of exceptionalism may be unique to individual states in historical peri-
ods in time, exceptionalism as foreign policy discourse is not. Much to the contrary,
as our cases illustrate, their family resemblance demands comparisons throughout
history and across cases and world regions.
Exceptionalist discourse expresses a peculiar link between a state’s foreign policy
and its self-understanding as a unique society or civilization that is related to some
form of higher order revelation or spiritual or otherworldly character. This link is
peculiar because it establishes uniqueness as a foundation for, first, a conviction of
moral superiority over virtually every other society, based on which the self-ascribed
exceptionalist state pursues an allegedly universal common good in its foreign pol-
icy conduct. Second, exceptionalism based on uniqueness implies the belief in an
exceptional state’s disposition as impossible to be replicated by others. This inter-
play between uniqueness (or particularity) and universality is what constitutes the
paradox of exceptionalism: A unique insight into supposedly universal values and
their foreign policy implications is derived from a particular civilizational or spiri-
tual heritage, political history, and/or geographical location. In this understanding,
the impossibility of replicating the exceptional state makes the realization of these
values (like peace, democracy, individual rights) contingent upon the exceptional
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state’s success in foreign policy. In other words, the universal global good is depen-
dent on the unique and particular history of the exceptionalist state.5 This distin-
guishes exceptionalism from nationalism, a related yet distinct strain of thought that
also involves a strong feeling of superiority and, more often than not, exemptional-
ism (see below). Whereas exceptionalism refers to universalism, nationalism tends
to be particularistic and exclusive in nature. Nationalist discourses define superior-
ity first and foremost in ethnic or cultural terms with “finite if elastic boundaries”
(Anderson 1983, 7), less in moral or spiritual ones. By contrast, exceptionalist dis-
courses refer to a morality that all humankind should ideally adhere to.6
In our understanding, not all countries’ foreign policy discourses are exception-
alist. Neither are all those with claims to a foreign policy guided by supposedly uni-
versal moral norms. To illustrate this point, recall the debate around Canada or Aus-
tralia as “good international citizens” (or “Global Good Samaritans”; Brysk 2009).
This very concept, as put forward by Australian foreign minister Gareth Evans in
the early 1990s, implies that all states should and are—in principle—capable of ful-
filling their moral duties as global citizens. Such duties typically include the defense
of human rights, participation in peacekeeping missions, and generally the contri-
bution to the solution of collective action problems globally. Special responsibilities
for certain states may arise from certain capabilities or resources; yet, responsibili-
ties in principle are not based on a distinctive status or unique domestic qualities.
In fact, the terminology of citizenship incorporates the belief that moral duties and
responsibilities are both intelligible and applicable to all members of international
society.7 Moreover, the good international citizenship in its official (i.e., Australian
or Canadian) variant was motivated at least partly by strategic considerations with
regard to an external audience. The result was an exercise in public diplomacy as
much as in actual foreign policy. This contrasts with our notion of exceptionalism,
which, although routinely serving as a legitimating device for specific foreign poli-
cies, is hardly ever directed primarily at foreign audiences (McCrisken 2003, 4).8
Thus, exceptionalism as foreign policy discourse goes beyond what former US
president Barack Obama insinuated in 2009, that is, the banal claim for unique-
ness virtually every country can legitimately make (see also Hughes 2015, 538).9
Importantly, the question for us is not whether states are truly exceptional. This is
an issue dealt with primarily in historical research focusing on US exceptionalism
(as for instance Lepgold and McKeown 1995; Lipset 1997; Shafer 1991; Wang 2015)
and often brought forward in political commentaries or opinion pieces (e.g., Walt
2011, 2012). Instead, in terms of identity construction, we consider how certain
states understand themselves as exceptional and how this not only constitutes their
foreign policy discourses but ultimately also—among other factors—their “being”
5
What has been called the “chasm between universality and particularity” means that the universal has no “content”
of its own but is always a particular that has become dominant at some moment (Laclau 1992, 87). Seen from this
perspective, exceptionalism is merely one particular “combination” of the universal and the particular.
6
Liberal types of nationalism, as put forward by statists in international political theory such as David Miller or
Thomas Nagel, do refer to a universal morality while at the same time claiming that a given political community’s alle-
giance is primarily with its own people. Such theories, if reaching foreign policy discourses at all, are not exceptionalist
because of the second criteria above: civic virtues such as solidarity or democratic participation are not conceived as
impossible to replicate by other political communities.
7
Similarly, Costa Rican claims to exceptionalism (no standing army) are based on universal principles not unique-
ness (Brysk 2009, 95–118). Bhutan, another contender for qualifying as exceptionalist, in fact, does not satisfy our
criteria for inverse reasoning: although claims to uniqueness inform its social and political domestic set-up, such claims
do not extend beyond Bhutan’s borders. That is, the particular is not universalized.
8
We discard claims to a Nordic exceptionalism popularized in the 1980s for similar reasons (Adler-Nissen and Gad
2014). Whereas the exceptionalist discourses considered below are expressions of political identities, what has been
termed Nordic exceptionalism, in large parts, was a deliberate and strategic attempt in forging a foreign policy brand
(Browning 2007, 31).
9
Barack Obama in 2009: “I believe in American exceptionalism, just as I suspect that the Brits believe in British ex-
ceptionalism and the Greeks believe in Greek exceptionalism” (quoted in Schlesinger 2011). This statement expectedly
brought him a large amount of domestic criticism.
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as foreign policy actors.10 Although we are aware of the importance of accounting
for mismatches between how policies are framed and how they are implemented,
we concur with scholars who speak out against treating exceptionalism as either
“mere rhetoric” or as just a “manipulative tool employed by policy makers” (Holsti
2010, 382; Hunt 1987, 15; McCrisken 2003, 17; Widmaier 2007, 782, 785). Instead,
we follow the understanding that exceptionalist beliefs “frame the discourse of for-
eign policy making by providing the underlying assumptions and terms of reference
for foreign policy debate and conduct” (Khong 2013, 41). As such, exceptionalist
discourses come in many forms and nuances that can be more or less overt and
more or less explicit. For instance, in many cases the content of a speech or certain
policies flow out of an exceptionalist self-understanding, without explicitly (or even
consciously) being framed as exceptionalism.
Finally, the claimed insights into a universally valid morality as the exclusive do-
main of a particular exceptionalist state (or civilization) feed into a conviction of
being exempt from those norms, rules, and conventions governing the international
relations of all other—unexceptional—states. However, as will be seen in our case
studies, a wider sense of exceptionalism does not necessarily mean exemptions from
concrete international rules such as laws or treaties but may instead apply to an
expanded notion of logics or “laws of history” (i.e., great power politics, cycles of
“rise and fall,” or civilizational conflicts). Here, our conceptualization of exception-
alism differs from those arguing that exceptionalism is necessarily exemptionalist,
meaning the attitude that the exceptionalist country is not bound by multilateral
regimes and agreements to the same extent as other states are or that international
treaties should apply to all states except for the exceptionalist state (Ignatieff 2005,
4–6; Bradford and Posner 2011, 7). Instead, we take exemptionalism as only one
of several potential characteristics. Thereby we may risk our framework to be un-
derstood as an attempt in diluting an established concept.11 This, however, would
be a misunderstanding. First, we maintain that one can hardly speak of exception-
alism as an “established concept” that goes beyond the case of American excep-
tionalism. Far from employing a widely accepted definition of exceptionalism, the
existing literature is ambiguous about whether exceptionalism and exemptional-
ism necessarily go hand in hand, or whether the latter is just a possible trait of
the former (e.g., Holsti 2010; Bradford and Posner 2011; Patman and Southgate
2016; Wheeler 2003; Hughes 2015). One of our motivations behind writing this
article is precisely that one needs to look beyond American exceptionalism to be
able to say something about exceptionalism per se. Second, at the core of (almost)
all exceptionalisms considered in the literature is the unequivocal belief in a par-
ticular insight into the universal good that is understood as vital for international
society/mankind/progress in international relations. As a result, all exceptionalist
discourses do exhibit a certain exemptionalism in the sense that the respective soci-
ety is understood as being exempt from the “ignorance” other societies and nations
suffer from. Yet, as illustrated below, this exceptionalist characteristic—or epistemic
exemptionalism—does not necessarily translate into the renunciation of interna-
tional rules and norms. In fact, the opposite may be true. If we simply equated
exceptionalism with exemptionalism, we would lose sight of exceptionalism as one
amongst several potential motivations behind exemptionalism in international law
(Bradford and Posner 2011).
To probe the argument, what would happen to our nonexemptionalist discourses
(as in our cases of Turkey and India) if we did not count them as truly excep-
tionalist? Besides the fact that discourses in those countries have explicitly and
10
Without being able to go into detail here, we adhere to what has been called a relational-processual understanding
of “the state” in terms of it being constantly produced through discourse/practice/performance (Jackson and Nexon
1999, 309, 316–19).
11
We owe this thought to Patrick Thaddeus Jackson.
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throughout history articulated their foreign policy as exceptionalist themselves,
discarding them as nonexceptionalist, in our view, would be both nonproductive
and problematic: Nonproductive, as we might then overlook the potential of these
nonexemptionalist foreign policy discourses to eventually become exemptional-
ist. By contrast, our typology allows us to consider and learn more about shifts in
variants of exceptionalism over time. Equating exceptionalism with exemptional-
ism would also be problematic, as such a narrow definition that largely concurs
with American exceptionalism and the confrontational features commonly ascribed
to it bears the risk of becoming a self-fulfilling prophesy that is already haunt-
ing some of the scholarship on Chinese exceptionalism: this is what rising/great
powers (like the United States) do, which is why they will necessarily become con-
frontational (like the United States). Again, in order to challenge this conven-
tional wisdom, one needs to move beyond a US (and Western) -centric concept of
exceptionalism.
Common Criteria, Ideal-Types, and Cases
The unsystematic incorporation of complex historical events is one of the pitfalls in
the development of international theory from empirical research. Here, the ideal
type methodology is particularly helpful as it reduces complexity of the empirical
by accentuating only certain characteristic traits and by bringing together a num-
ber of individual events in order to expand its applicability (Plagemann 2015, 43;
Haugaard 2006, 9).
As Max Weber notes with reference to ideal-type economic theory: “In reality,
action takes exactly this course only in unusual cases, as sometimes on the stock
exchange; and even then there is usually only an approximation to the ideal type”
(Weber 1978, 9). Thus, the ideal type “does not in itself constitute an explanation
of the individual historical cases to which it is applied. [It] merely provides the con-
ceptual frame and suggests the point of entry for the actual historical explanation”
(Kedar 2007, 341–42). In other words, the ideal type is not a means for generaliza-
tion of empirical patterns. Once established convincingly, ideal types not only help
in understanding (rather than describing) the “empirical reality” of individual cases
(Lawson 2012, 219); importantly, they also facilitate the theorization of their inter-
play. In contrast to a merely descriptive list of occurrences confined to particular
instances, our exceptionalist ideal types both speak to each other and invite their
application to more cases than the ones considered in this article.
Common Criteria
All exceptionalist states understand themselves as fundamentally different from
other states. However, exceptionalist foreign policy discourses are not only about
difference from otherwise comparable states but also about superiority in moral
terms (see also Holsti 2010, 384). As we will illustrate below, articulations of ex-
ceptionalism regarded the United States as different from, and morally superior
to, feudal Europe; China as different from and superior to its neighbors and the
West; and both India and Turkey as different and superior to the Western great
powers. Superiority in each case can take a slightly different connotation; but all
forms of superiority involve a moral or spiritual element. This latter element only
becomes relevant to foreign policy due to the belief in its universal validity beyond
a respective nation’s borders. The discourse of moral superiority may have differ-
ent sources, among which a given state’s civilizational or spiritual heritage and/or
comparable economic or social success stand out. Yet, as our examples show, ex-
ceptionalist discourses have surfaced and prevailed even in states relatively inferior
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Table 1. Four ideal-types of exceptionalism (authors’ compilation)
Exemplary Character Missionary Character
Exemptionalist Civilizational Exceptionalism Imperialist Exceptionalism
Nonexemptionalist Internationalist Exceptionalism Globalist Exceptionalism
in terms of economic progress, welfare, or technological advancement.12 All excep-
tionalist discourses evolve around the paradoxical relationship between universality
and particularity: the exceptionalist state claims particular and exclusive access to
the universal good. The universal becomes visible only through the lens of that one
particular political history or spiritual or civilizational heritage.
Ideal-Types
Beyond this common thread of superiority due to a unique insight into a universal
morality, exceptionalism may take different forms along two dimensions.
First, exceptionalist states may understand their superiority in moral terms as
a call for an either missionary or exemplary foreign policy. In a missionary self-
understanding, moral superiority comes with a duty to “proselytize and convert”
others.13 In practice, the means of conversion may vary greatly. This is exposed
in the next section, which compares, among others, Jawaharlal Nehru’s India and
the United States under President G. W. Bush. By contrast, a self-understanding
as exemplary may entail the same degree of moral superiority without the desire
to convert others. Again, in practice reasoning behind this varies from essentially
moral arguments against the praxis of conversion, skepticism with regard to the suc-
cess of missionary engagements, to a general disinterest in the wider (uncivilized)
world. In the Chinese case, throughout history we see variations of and between the
exemplary and missionary character. For instance, contemporary China explicitly
distances itself from having a missionary aim toward the outside world and claims
to be essentially different from the West in this regard (Zhang 2011, 319).14 On the
other end of the spectrum, being exemplary may feed into isolationist desires, as
was the case in the United States of the 1930s.
Second, exceptionalism may go along with either exemptionalism or nonexemption-
alism in global politics. Nonexemptionalism emphasizes engagement and dialogue
over confrontation, and multilateralism over unilateralism, as will be demonstrated
by the cases of pre-2016 Turkish discourses and of India under Nehru. In both
cases, adherence to international law, international cooperation amongst equals,
and a conflict-mediating role in international politics were traits attributed to the
exceptional character of each country. However, exceptionalism may also result in
exemptionalism in dealing with international law and institutions, as defended by
US neoconservatives of the 2000s.
Based on the above we discern four ideal types of exceptionalist foreign policy
discourses (see Table 1). As noted, ideal types are “self-ironic” (Kedar 2007, 332)
abstractions of historical events; concrete foreign policy discourses, as discussed be-
low, only resemble one ideal type more than the other.
12
Phillips (2014, 715–16) argues that the understanding of Western technological supremacy in the nineteenth
century as a “self-evident vindication of claims of civilisational superiority” was a genuinely distinctive trait of theWestern
civilizing missions when compared to otherwise similar activities of the non-West.
13
According to McCrisken, American exceptionalism is driven by the idea that “inside every foreigner there is the
potential, even the desire, to be an American,” whether they realize it or not (McCrisken 2003, 11; Restad 2012, 62).
14
However, Beijing’s policies in Xinjiang, in Tibet, and toward Taiwan clearly have an active missionary component
(although not classified as “foreign” policy by China; see Callahan 2008, 756). Also historically, China has not ruled by
example only. According to Callahan “many [Chinese scholars] feel that it is the duty of patriotic Chinese to spread
Chinese values, language and culture not just in Asia, but around the world” (Callahan 2008, 757).
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Imperialist Exceptionalism is characterized by a missionary foreign policy discourse
and exemptionalism in questions of global politics. Imperialist exceptionalism
comes with a proselytizing aim to convert and liberate others in the pursuit of an
allegedly universal common good that the exceptionalist state stands for and has a
particular access to. This exceptional duty in principle justifies transgressing inter-
national law and conventions binding the unexceptional rest.
Civilizational Exceptionalism stands for an exemplary foreign policy discourse com-
bined with exemptionalism in questions of global politics. Civilizational exception-
alism, a self-understanding as the world’s center and most advanced civilization,
comes with a general disregard for the barbaric, underdeveloped or otherwise in-
ferior others. The aim is to stay out of entanglements with the unexceptional rest
while pursuing the perfection of one’s own society. Thus, civilizational exceptional-
ism comprises an isolationist foreign policy.
Internationalist Exceptionalism fuses an exemplary foreign policy discourse with a
nonexemptionalist approach to international rules and a general appreciation of
egalitarian multilateralism as a modus operandi of world politics. The exemplary
character is based on specific geographical, historical, or cultural circumstances
that make the respective society an example for those situated at a lower level of
political development. Internationalist exceptionalism comes with a claim for spe-
cial (leadership) status, a self-confident foreign policy, and a paternalistic approach
vis-à-vis the unexceptional rest.
Globalist Exceptionalism reflects a missionary foreign policy discourse with nonex-
emptionalism in questions of global politics and multilateralism. Here, the mission-
ary aspect, however, is not intrusive or interventionist but goes hand in hand with
respect for binding international norms. Globalist exceptionalism is characterized
by moralizing in international fora and narcissism at home. Due to this type’s mis-
sionary zeal, the unexceptional rest is the object of tutoring and paternalism. On
the other hand, this type of exceptionalism proactively defends equal principles for
all states and considers a diverse yet unified world society as a long-term goal to
strive for.
Cases: Exceptionalism, Power, and Ambition
The prominence that exceptionalism enjoyed—and continues to enjoy—in US dis-
courses (both academic and in policy practice) may suggest that exceptionalism
is essentially a phenomenon exclusive to states with outstanding global power. In
this reading, exceptionalism is only a symptom of de facto superiority in (mate-
rial and nonmaterial) power resources: from British colonialists in the late nine-
teenth century to US American neoconservatives, the exercise of power politics was
disguised—and legitimated—in the garb of exceptionalism. As noted above, this
“conventional wisdom” has been applied to China as well.
We argue that in spite of obvious interrelations with power resources and po-
tentials, exceptionalism is not necessarily a great or super power phenomenon per
se.15 Consider that its origins can be found in seventeenth century US history, when
America was far from being a great power. On the other hand, exceptionalist for-
eign policy discourses have been absent in several other regionally important pow-
ers. Germany’s foreign policy since reunification, for a number of reasons including
historical and strategic ones, refuses to occupy any exceptional role.16 Whenever
Berlin deviated from its alliance partners (e.g., on interventions in Libya or Iraq), it
15
From a realist perspective both US and Indian exceptionalism have been criticized as “idealist” and as constraining
both countries in acting according to the principles of realpolitik (Cha 2015b, 3; Lepgold and McKeown 1995, 369;
Karnad 2015, 64).
16
In German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier’s words: “Our historical experience has destroyed any belief
in national exceptionalism—for any nation” (Steinmeier 2016).
20 Comparative Exceptionalism
did so with great pains, constantly reiterating its otherwise “normal” role as a reliant
transatlantic and European partner.
As will be illustrated below, a comparative view suggests that ambition to power
and influence, not actual capacity, is a necessary, but not a sufficient, characteris-
tic for exceptionalist foreign policy discourses as we conceptualize them. Ambition
refers to the domestic ideas of a state’s envisaged foreign policy capacities and/or
its legitimate place in global politics. It corresponds to the paradox of exceptional-
ism: the idea of a particular entitlement to pursue and realize a universal goal. This
makes the study of exceptionalism relevant for debates around a posthegemonic or
“multinodal” world and explains our selection of illustrative cases below: ambition
to power and influence in world affairs, rather than actual capacity.17 By looking
into the cases from the world’s two most prominent “rising powers”—China and In-
dia, with greatly diverging (material and social) capabilities in power projection—
we show that the persistence of exceptionalism is not unique to the United States,
as claimed by Holsti and most other scholars on American exceptionalism. By cov-
ering a so-called “middle power”18 (with great power past)—Turkey—we further
expose the variety of exceptionalism across world regions. As will be seen, the vari-
ety of exceptionalisms also supports our second critique of the existing (US-centric)
literature, which has focused on the confrontational features supposedly inherent
to exceptionalist foreign policy discourses.19
Reviewing Exceptionalist Foreign Policy Discourses in the United States, China,
India, and Turkey
American Exceptionalism20
American exceptionalism is commonly traced back to the colonial period. Histori-
cally, it refers to the puritan settler John Winthrop’s pronunciation of a “city upon
a hill” in 1630 and the American Revolution with the Declaration of Independence
in 1776 committed to “freedom, morality and the betterment of humankind,” in
distinction from Europe at that time. Alexis de Tocqueville is typically taken to be
the first author to use the term American exceptionalism as such in his Democracy in
America.21
Two main strands of US exceptionalist thought are commonly identified: First,
the exemplary strand that goes back to the “city upon a hill,” and became
widespread since the founding of the republic and further enhanced by Enlight-
enment ideals, including the rule of law, private property, representative gov-
ernment, freedom of speech and religion, and commercial liberty (Patman and
Southgate 2016, 223). Until today, it refers to the central principles of the Declara-
tion of Independence upheld by the Constitution. As quoted by President Obama
in his second inaugural address: “We recall that what binds this nation together is
not the colors of our skin or the tenets of our faith or the origins of our names. What
makes us exceptional—what makes us American—is our allegiance to an idea artic-
ulated in a declaration made more than two centuries ago: ‘We hold these truths
to be self-evident, that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their
17
“The advantage of ‘multinodal’ as a term for the new era is that it points to a pattern of asymmetric international
relationships shaped by economic convergence and globalization. A post-hegemonic world is not simply de-centered or
multiply centered, it is re-patterned” (Womack 2014, 172).
18
Middle powers are commonly understood as nations without the capacity and ambition to cover all or most fields
of global governance but whose foreign policy nonetheless is capable of making a difference in certain fields or regions
(Cooper 1997). An often-noted example is South Korea.
19
We do not claim that the cases looked at here are the only ones falling under our conceptualization. Instead, the
typology and cases stand at the beginning of future comparative research.
20
Parts of this section build on Nymalm (2015).
21
For a forceful critique of the common (historical) reading of US exceptionalism as a “product of US identity,”
rather than power, see Hughes (2015).
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Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness.’” (TheWhite House 2013). Second, the missionary strand that
relates to the belief in a “manifest destiny,” which became more influential after
the 1840s and the westward expansion (McEvoy-Levy 2001, 24; Monten 2005, 129;
Nayak and Malone 2009, 266; Wheeler 2003, 206). From both strands, McCrisken
(2003, 8) discerns three main elements in American exceptionalism: (1) that the
United States as a special nation has a special destiny, (2) that it is different from
the rest of the world (historically, first and foremost from Europe), and (3) that
contrary to other (great) nations the United States will not rise and fall.22 Onuf in
turn distinguishes between “liberal” and “conservative” exceptionalism, the former
one envisioning “the end of history” in terms of “the ultimate Americanization of
the world,” whereas conservative exceptionalism insists on the United States always
being different and superior to all others (Onuf 2012, 81).
Scholars on US exceptionalism in general classify it as part of American identity
deeply embedded within elite and popular circles (McCrisken 2003, 2, 4, 17; Patman
2006, 965).23 Restad even argues that “American identity is most usefully defined as
American exceptionalism because the belief in American exceptionalism has been
a powerful, persistent, and popular myth throughout American history, and further-
more, it has been used in formulating arguments for ever more internationalist and
expanding foreign policies” (Restad 2012, 55).
Both the exemplary and missionary strands converge in the view that American
political values are universal in their nature (McCrisken 2003, 5, 8). Yet, they also
exhibit a tension between universality (in terms of its universal, missionary claims)
and particularity (in terms of the United States being exemplary and always dif-
ferent) within American exceptionalism. Advocates of the exemplary strand have
maintained that the United States must lead by example and have peaceful diplo-
matic and trade relations, but stay out of other countries’ affairs. Proponents of the
missionary strand, in turn, contend that the United States must actively assist oth-
ers to become like them (McCrisken 2003, 11). The missionary strand includes the
reasoning of the United States occasionally having to transgress prevailing norms
in order to fulfill its “exceptionalist” duties. Accordingly, the “liberation” of other
peoples and societies as part of a global “struggle for freedom” has been a persis-
tent goal of US policy makers since the founding fathers. Examples from history
include the wars against Mexico and Spain, as well as the forced “opening” of Japan
and China in the mid-nineteenth century (Holsti 2010, 382, 385). The most cited
examples of a clash between these two strands are president Woodrow Wilson’s pro-
posal for the League of Nations in 1919, its ultimate rejection by the US senate,
and the continuation of the debate between “isolationists” and “internationalists”
during the interwar years (McCrisken 2003, 15).24
Both strands in American foreign policy discourses may include a strong sense
of exemptionalism. Examples range from the refusal of treaty and protocol ratifi-
cations (e.g., the Kyoto protocol, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the United
Nations Convention on the Law of Sea) to actual violations like the 2003 Iraq war
(Holsti 2010, 389; Hughes 2015, 528; Bradford and Posner 2011, 4). According to
Ruggie, and in line with the above cases, exemptionalist resistance is found most
22
Nayak and Malone differentiate between American Orientalism, directed toward non-Western countries, and
American exceptionalism, directed toward Western—particularly European—countries (2009). Siobhan McEvoy-Levy
argues that during the Cold War American, exceptionalism was extended to include Western Europe in what he calls
“Transatlantic Exceptionalism” (2001, 29).
23
According to polling results in 2011, the belief of America being greater (38%) or greatest along some other
countries (53%) was held by nine in ten US-Americans (Onuf 2012, 1). On American exceptionalism as an “informal
ideology” see Robert Patman (2006, 946). Jonathan Monten speaks of liberal exceptionalism as a doctrine (2005, 116).
24
Historians criticize the common understanding among political scientists that US foreign policy has been iso-
lationist as inadequate and Euro-centric, as it does not take US policies on its own continent and in the southern
hemisphere into account. See Restad (2012) and Hughes (2015, 541).
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forcefully in Congress (2004, 2). Yet, the Donald Trump administration, too, has
adopted a pronouncedly exemptionalist line, most prominently displayed by with-
drawing the United States from the Transpacific Partnership and the Paris Climate
Agreement in 2017. An example for being exempt not from concrete laws or treaties
but from alleged “laws of history” is the third component noted byMcCrisken above,
that is, the belief that the United States will not rise and fall, like other great powers.
American exceptionalism continues to play a central role in US politics (Hughes
2015, 257). President G. W. Bush frequently articulated the promotion of democ-
racy and spread of “liberty and freedom” by the United States (Monten 2005, 112).
Exceptionalism and the question whether the then sitting president Barack Obama
adhered to it also featured prominently in the 2012 presidential election campaign
(Patman and Southgate 2016, 231).
While US foreign policy under G. W. Bush according to our typology comes clos-
est to the variant of imperialist exceptionalism, this has not always been the case. Pat-
man and Southgate refer to US foreign policy in the early 1990s as being “based
on a reasonably inclusive conception of US exceptionalism that envisaged an ex-
panded US leadership role, albeit one through either partnership with multilateral
institutions or in coalitions that enjoyed a wide measure of international support”
(2016, 226). In our typology, this latter discourse comes closest to the ideal type of
internationalist exceptionalism.
Although being constantly criticized domestically for not believing in American
exceptionalism, President Barack Obama has frequently referred to the United
States’ “indispensable role” internationally. This happened for example when ad-
vocating policies that were partly unpopular within his own administration, such
as intervening in Libya in 2011 and Syria in 2014 (Hughes 2015, 528; Jaffe 2015).
However, in 2011 Obama also emphasized that “the burden of action should not
be America’s alone [. . .] Real leadership creates the conditions and coalitions for
others to step up as well” (quoted in Patman and Southgate 2016, 230). Patman
and Southgate thus analyze Obama’s “refashioning of US exceptionalism” as, again,
directed toward a more inclusive type of exceptionalism. By contrast, the foreign
policy discourse of the Donald Trump presidency so far includes exemptionalist as
well as nonmissionary (or isolationist) elements, as illustrated most prominently in
its “America first” slogan.25
Chinese Exceptionalism
Like US exceptionalism, Chinese exceptionalism should not be taken as a unified
body of thought expressed under this very label. Instead, it has exhibited different
characteristics in different time periods. Although China and its foreign policies
have commonly been understood and classified as “distinctive” by most scholars, it
is only since the beginning of the last decade or so that they have been analyzed
under the rubric of Chinese exceptionalism (Zhang 2011, 305–06; Ho 2014, 165).
The common denominator of Chinese exceptionalism throughout its history
from ancient times to the present is a belief in Chinese supremacy and goodness
(Ho 2014). Exceptionalism in imperial China was expressed through claims about
China’s centrality and superiority and the “benevolent and magnanimous nature
of its foreign policy,” reflected in concepts such as Zhongguo (the middle kingdom)
and Tianxia (all under heaven) and practiced through what has been called the
Chinese tributary system (Zhang 2011, 308).26 Although not deriving from an in-
stitutionalized religion, in imperial China there was a clear sense of a country and
25
See Beinart (2017) for a debate about whether Trump himself believes in or acts according to American excep-
tionalism.
26
For a critical discussion of Zhao Tingyang’s popular rearticulation of the Tianxia concept see Callahan (2008).
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its ruler being “chosen by Heaven,”27 not unlike the US understanding of “man-
ifest destiny” (Ho 2014, 166). After the downfall of the last dynasty (the Qing in
1911) during what is still referred to as the “century of humiliation,” and the found-
ing of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, China’s distinctiveness was
maintained in the form of a widely shared feeling of entitlement to great power
status.28 In addition, a persisting moral authority was and continues to be derived
precisely from China’s “unfair treatment” by the Western powers. Meanwhile, China
sees itself as sticking to its immutable principles of equality and justice (Ho 2014,
165; Zhang 2011, 309). Mao Zedong, in turn, propagated China’s own way of re-
alizing world communism in differentiation from the West, an approach termed
revolutionary sinocentrism/tianxiaism by Zhang (2011, 310). “Socialism with Chi-
nese characteristics” became the official ideology of the communist party since the
1980s, while the notion “with Chinese characteristics” continues to be used by policy
makers in different contexts (Ho 2014, 165). Contemporary Chinese exceptional-
ism entails the claim of being a “different great power” from the West (Wang 2015,
51). According to this narrative, a peaceful and harmonious state China represents
an alternative model of development and order in world politics. These alternatives
are expressed in what is understood as “benevolent pacifism” and “harmonious in-
clusivism” (Alden and Large 2011, 21). Further characterizations include the ter-
minology of a “Confucian great power” following the principle of “harmony with
difference” (Nordin 2016; Zhang 2011, 311–14). In essence such claims include
not being (nor historically having been) expansionist, and acting in a status-quo
oriented, benevolent, and morally informed way (Wang 2015, 52). Peacefulness is
understood as differentiation from the West, in particular the United States and the
not so peaceful Pax Americana (Callahan 2012, 34).29
Chinese exceptionalism is a potentially important source of foreign policy ideas
(Zhang 2011, 305) that deeply resonates with the broader public (Ho 2014, 167–
68). Alden and Large (2011), in their case study on China in Africa, point out that
here Chinese exceptionalism has been promoted explicitly. In line with Zhang, they
characterize China’s claim to being exceptional as “a claim to entitlement by virtue
of China’s ontological status rather than its behavioral characteristics” (Alden and
Large 2011, 23 citing Stephen Levine). Legitimacy is based on claims to moral or
ideological superiority, rather than on actually delivering successful policies (Ho
2014, 169). However, Alden and Large also emphasize that exceptionalism is more
than mere rhetoric (see also Ho 2014, 167). China’s presence in Africa shows that
the claim to offer a different set of policies than the West, based on “political equal-
ity, mutual benefit, sovereignty, non-interference and win–win cooperation” actually
constrains Chinese foreign policy if these ideals cannot be met. After having served
as a door opener to engagement with Africa, China cannot simply drop its rhetoric
of exceptionalism. As a result, conflicts between commercial interests and the moral
high ground emerge (Alden and Large 2011, 23, 29, 31).
The past decade’s political and academic debate on a “China model” (Bell
2015) has also exhibited different exceptionalist features, as for instance, China’s
policy toward developing countries (also dubbed the “Beijing Consensus”; see
27
The common translation of the Chinese tian in tianxia as “heaven” has been criticized by Sinologists as being
misleading because of the transcendental religious connotations of the Western term, which they argue is not aligned
with Chinese understandings of tian (e.g. Hall and Ames 1998, 233). We owe this reference to Astrid Nordin.
28
On how this may feed into Chinese nationalism see Ho (2014, 168).
29
Callahan criticizes the attribution of Chinese exceptionalism by Chinese and non-Chinese scholars as “Sino speak”
and simply new Orientalism. He argues against historically contrasting the “war mongering Westphalian Europe” with a
“peace-loving imperial China,” as this would rest on a narrow understanding of war as interstate war. Callahan points to
numerous violent interactions along China’s frontiers, for instance during the last Qing dynasty (Callahan 2008, 755).
In this sense, Zhang classifies Chinese pacifist self-attributions as “a vast underestimate of the complexity of Chinese
history accomplishable only through heroic reductionism and essentialism” (Zhang 2011, 318). Wang in turn claims
that China has and will simply behave like a “realist great power” (Wang 2015, 71).
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Ramo 2004), it’s domestic system as a mixture between socialism and capitalism
that has received labels such as “authoritarian capitalism” or “illiberal capitalism”
(Rachman 2008), and the interrelation of both (Halper 2010). While these labels
originated in outside attributions, a China model is also occasionally promoted by
Beijing under this very notion (e.g., Pan 2014). Other contemporary examples of
official self-descriptions as exceptional without necessarily calling it exceptionalism
can be found in Chinese discourses on its “peaceful rise” and “harmonious soci-
ety” in a “harmonious world” (Callahan 2008, 758; Nordin 2016). The Confucian
principle “harmony with difference” refers to the understanding of “acknowledg-
ing differences while harmonizing their relationships,” which is characterized as
contributing to “China’s exceptionalist problem-solving approach” (Zhang 2011,
312). In this sense Zhang classifies Chinese exceptionalism as “in part a product
of the ideological discourse to facilitate China’s rise,” but also as “an example of
the use of history and culture to discursively counter structural pressures from the
international system” (Zhang 2011, 317).
China’s deliberate and selective employment of its history of ideas has become
particularly visible in the promotion of official readings of Confucian and other
ancient sources (Noesselt 2015). According to Bai (2012), Confucian philosophy
not only continues to be deeply engrained in Chinese ways of thinking, it also con-
tributes a number of arguments for defending Chinese exceptionalism in terms of
its political system and foreign policy. A key element is Confucianism’s purported
defense of hierarchy, both domestically and externally. Hierarchy domestically—
that is inequality in terms of political rights—is typically defended with reference
to meritocracy’s superiority over liberal democratic systems in terms of efficiency or
output legitimacy. Externally, Bai defends a hierarchy of states with reference to the
Confucian distinction between “barbaric” and “civilized” states (Bai 2012, 44–45).
He concedes that, like Western states, China throughout its history was imperialist
at times. However, in Bai’s words, China “transformed people into Chinese and ren-
dered their land Chinese not simply by killing or oppressing them, in the manner
of many Western nation-states and empires, but by ‘converting’ them through the
soft power of a purportedly superior culture” (Bai 2012, 45). Independent from
its historical accuracy, this specific reading of history entails a strong sense of hi-
erarchy based on Chinese civilization as a unique model for other peoples. Histo-
rians who have studied China’s imperial past under the rubric of colonialism—in
particular the Qing era (1644–1912) as one of the largest territorial expansions
in seventeenth and eighteenth century world history (Di Cosmo 1998, 288; see also
Hostetler 2005)—contest these kinds of “soft power” interpretations.30 In fact, Qing
colonial rule looked very different depending on the region. Whereas in the case
of South China and Taiwan the local population was subject to a rather forceful
“civilizing process,” this was not necessarily the case in the “outer provinces,” Ti-
bet, Central Asia, and Mongolia (Di Cosmo 1998, 289, 293, 294). Perdue charac-
terizes the different modes of rule as perpetuation of a universalist ideology in dif-
ferent guises (Perdue 2009, 95, 96). He also points out that the contemporary Chi-
nese leadership struggles with controlling different historical discourses that mix
China’s “imperial past, its defeat by other colonial powers and its revolutionary na-
tionalism,” which all contradict each other as well as the “peaceful rise” discourse
(Perdue 2009, 102, 103). Accordingly, in our typology, China is an example that not
only shifted between different dominant types of exceptionalism but where they
were also present simultaneously. Hence—depending on the historical period and
region looked at—China in our typology comes closest to imperialist and/or civiliza-
tional exceptionalism.31
30
We are grateful to one anonymous reviewer for pointing us toward this literature.
31
See Kellog (2016) for a discussion on a potential Chinese exemptionalism regarding the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration on China’s claims in the
South China Sea in 2016.
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Indian Exceptionalism
Sometimes described as “moral exceptionalism” (Smith 2012), Indian exceptional-
ism in foreign policy was most forcefully expressed in the period immediately after
India won its independence (1947) under Prime Minister Nehru who simultane-
ously acted as foreign minister. In fact, India’s diplomacy, from independence until
today, is renowned for its “moral tone,” centering on the idea that India possessed a
“unique capacity to offer moral leadership in world affairs” (Sullivan 2014, 640).32
Indians’ struggle against colonialism took up and reinforced the idea that In-
dia was a spiritually different species, a new nation in a world dominated by re-
alpolitik. Whereas the West was culturally closer to India’s elite, socialized both
by British colonial practice and academic institutions, it was nonetheless politically
and morally discredited. By contrast, India’s “‘spirit of assertive nationalism,’ as it
came to be defined in the context of international affairs, centered on a belief in
India’s unquestioned civilizational moral pre-eminence and was felt as a sense of
mission that encouraged the projection of ‘moral conduct’ into the international
sphere” (Sullivan 2014, 650). In Nehru’s own words, throughout the 1920s and 30s
“Congress33 gradually developed a foreign policy which was based on the elimina-
tion of political and economic imperialism everywhere and the co-operation of free
nations” (Nehru 1956, 423).
Indian nationalism at the time of independence came in three powerful variants:
Gandhi’s syncretic and inclusive spirituality based on India as a territorial space;
Nehru’s liberal understanding of a modern, secular Indian state “rooted in a glo-
rious spiritual past and drawing on Vedic traditions” (Sullivan 2014, 644; Nehru
1956); and Hindu nationalism, equating India’s identity with Hinduism exclusively.
For all three variants, a historical claim—that India possessed a unique source of re-
ligion and spirituality—supported a missionary claim that India had the capacity and
obligation to provide moral leadership in world affairs. The Gandhian and Nehru-
vian variants incorporated a third claim for Indian superiority, a unique “capacity
to synthesize different and conflicting perspectives and merge with other modes of
thought and belief” (Sullivan 2014, 650).
The diversity across South Asia ensured a long intellectual tradition accustomed
to integrating elements from diverse sources and explicitly treating the question
of how to reconcile the particular—cultural, religious, linguistic, and political—
within a universal normative framework.34 According to Sullivan, “implicit in this
discourse of synthesis and universalism was of course a sense of superiority: the idea
that Indians—or a certain type of Indian—were innately predisposed to engage in
the task of conflict resolution and, therefore, morally above those who were repeat-
edly drawn to violence” (2014, 651). Congress’s victory over imperialism, a victory
relying on disciplined nonviolence andmass support, contributed to a widely shared
belief in the “potency of ideas alone,” also in the foreign policy realm (Nayar and
Paul 2003, 140), as did the territorial integration of more than five hundred princely
states in a liberal-democratic federal polity through peaceful negotiations within the
first three years of independence (Guha 2007, 35–58; Nayar and Paul 2003, 122).
Exceptionalist elements in India’s foreign policy discourse were particularly visi-
ble throughout the early post-independence years from 1946 to 1954, during which
direct challenges to India’s security were more abstract than in the years prior to
the Sino-Indian border war of 1962 (Nayar and Paul 2003, 116). Then, the belief
in India’s diplomatic prowess—Nehru’s “zeal for diplomacy that would be difficult
to overstate” (Kennedy 2012, 142)—was based in large parts on the very conviction
32
Also see Cohen (2001), Narlikar and Narlikar (2014), Datta-Ray (2015).
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The Indian National Congress was a liberation movement led by Mahatma Gandhi and Nehru; Congress became
India’s predominant political party after independence.
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The most prominent representative of which is Rabindranath Tagore.
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that India was destined to play a key role in global politics regardless of its actual
material power capabilities (Nayar and Paul 2003, 115).
In combining an activist foreign policy with frequent references to moral princi-
ples, Nehru translated the notion of moral exceptionalism into his foreign policy
conduct. Its key principles—“India should serve as a model of principled action, shy
away from using force in its international relations, and respect international law
and institutions” (Smith 2012, 374)—were not only publicly defended by the prime
minister himself but also widely shared across the small foreign policy-making elite.
Their “belief in India’s unquestioned civilisational moral pre-eminence [. . .] was
felt as a sense of mission that encouraged the projection of ‘moral conduct’ into
the international sphere” (Sullivan 2014, 650). The self-understanding of moral su-
periority was further reinforced by comparisons with both the Western and Eastern
camp in the early Cold War period. In Indian eyes, the adoption of ruthless power
politics by both camps stood in marked contrast to India’s nonalignment policy.
Nehruvian critiques of balance of power politics, a key theme of India’s foreign pol-
icy, have been informed and legitimized at least partly by India’s moral exception-
alism in foreign affairs. Today’s doctrine of “strategic autonomy”—the principled
rejection of binding alliances—stems from this body of thought.
Despite its insistence on autonomy, independent India invested heavily in craft-
ing ties across the postcolonial world. New Delhi provided substantial support in
establishing the UN and drafting the Universal Declaration. According to Bhaga-
van, Nehru’s India sought a “post-sovereign nation state” in “a world of states gov-
erned by the meta-sovereign institution of the UN” (2010, 313). Nehru refused an
American offer for a permanent seat in the UNSC, arguing that China merited the
seat, and publicly supported communist China’s international recognition as part
of his wider agenda of giving voice to the Asian and African countries (Khosla 2014,
311). The idea of “morally-derived self-restraint” (Sullivan 2014, 652) also featured
prominently in India’s nuclear weapons policies. Throughout nonproliferation ne-
gotiations in the 1960, for instance, “India emphasised its technical capacity to en-
gage in nuclear weapons proliferation alongside its moral decision to refrain from
doing so” (Sullivan 2014, 653).35
Nehru regularly pushed issues such as decolonization, racial equality, and op-
position to white settler regimes in Southern Africa; aid for development; and a
restructuring of the UN to give Asia and Africa a greater say onto the interna-
tional agenda—all issues close to India’s own colonial and developmental expe-
rience (Nayar and Paul 2003, 136). However, missionary elements in his foreign
policy discourse were particularly visible in his vocal campaign for nonalignment,
both domestically and internationally, which sought to include as many postcolo-
nial states as possible—at the cost of complicating New Delhi’s relations with Wash-
ington for years (Kennedy 2015, 101).36 Just like noninterference did not imply
passivity, nonalignment implied neither neutrality nor isolation; instead, India un-
der Nehru pursued an activist foreign policy that “sought to bring to world affairs
what it thought was a distinctive voice and approach from a newly emergent Asia”
(Nayar and Paul 2003, 135). For instance, in 1950, India refused to sign the Treaty
of Peace with Japan in San Francisco—despite the fact that it had been accepted
by Japan itself—on the ground that it did not honor Japan’s sovereignty and inde-
pendence sufficiently.37 India’s exceptionalist foreign policy discourse of the Nehru
era thus combines a missionary intention with an nonexemptionalist approach to
35
Although the refusal to sign the Nonproliferation Treaty in 1967 carries a sense of exemptionalism, discourses
legitimating India’s stance typically include calls for a different nonproliferation regime, rather than an exemption only
for India (Sullivan 2012).
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India’s contribution to the establishment of and subsequent leadership in the NonalignmentMovement illustrates
the missionary component of Nehru’s foreign policy further.
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India negotiated a separate peace treaty signed in 1952 (Sato 2005).
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global rules and norms that is characteristic of and comes closest to what we term
globalist exceptionalism.
The low salience of foreign policy in electoral contests means that there is lit-
tle incentive for fundamental change. For instance, even though Narendra Modi
as prime minister surprised observers with his diplomatic activism,38 foreign policy
played close to no role in his election and his party program offered very few de-
tails. Particularistic narratives—“moral exceptionalism”—flourish in settings such
as this one. In fact, official foreign policy speeches throughout the 2000s continued
to include claims for an “ethical exceptionalism” (Hansel and Möller 2015, 85).
The most prominent foreign policy manifesto in recent years, published by a group
of well-connected intellectuals, takes up the idea: “All of India’s great leaders—
Gandhi, Tagore, Nehru, Ambedkar—had one aspiration: that India should be a site
for an alternative universality. India’s legitimacy today will come from its ability to
stand for the highest human and universal values” (Khilnani et al. 2012, 69; also see
Tharoor 2012, 428). The current prime minister, Narendra Modi, frequently claims
the role of “vishwaguru”—or world teacher—for India (Mohan 2015, 177).
Despite the continuities in foreign policy thought, recent developments may have
reduced the salience of exceptionalist discourses in India. Indo-US rapprochement
since the late 1990s has gradually undermined an orthodox understanding of non-
alliance and strategic autonomy. For instance, US calls for India to play a greater
role alongside the US Navy in maritime security have been met with sympathy by
Indian strategic circles (Singh 2015). Today the Indian Navy exercises with the
United States, Japan, and other regional navies fearful of Chinese expansionism.
In this regard, great or rising power status—including an apprehension for related
responsibilities—seems to limit, rather than foster, exceptionalist notions in Indian
strategic thought.
Turkish Exceptionalism39
Claims for Turkish exceptionalism both academically and in the official discourse
are commonly based on a unique relation between Islam and the state that had
evolved throughout the Ottoman Empire, survived the foundation of the Republic
(1923), and reemerged vigorously with the ascendance of the Islamist Justice and
Development Party (AKP) government under Tayyip Erdog˘an in the early 2000s.
Besides the Turkish polity’s specific institutional relationship between the state and
Islam, termed laiklik after the French term laïcisme (Davison 2003), Turkish excep-
tionalism typically refers to two other related elements: first, Turkey’s Ottoman past
and, second, its geographical location between Europe and Asia.
According to Mardin the “specifics of Turkish history have endowed the Ot-
tomans and the Turkish Republic with characteristics that have worked cumula-
tively to create a special setting for Islam, a setting where secularism and Islam
interpenetrate” (2005, 148). Influential modernist Turkish poets of the early Re-
public promoted a “renewalist Islam” that blurred the distinction between secular
nationalism and Islam, and therefore was attractive for “a new generation raised in
the Republican nationalist tradition” (Mardin 2005, 155). Contrary to conventional
and many official representations of Turkish history as a struggle between secu-
larism, modernism, and nationalism, on the one hand, and Islam, tradition, and
Sultanism, on the other, Mardin traces the evolution of a distinctively Turkish third
force which has greatly influenced Erdog˘an’s governing AKP today. Represented
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by, for instance, former prime minister Necmettin Erbakan, this third force neither
regarded the (secular) state as an enemy per se nor did it embrace radical Islamism
(Mardin 2005, 158). Instead, Erbakan and others underlined Islamic values and au-
thenticity, on the one hand, and the “national interest” including an appreciation
of the state’s means for action, on the other.
This sense of historical exceptionalism is linked to what some scholars termed
Turkey’s “geographic exceptionalism.”40 Turkish policy-makers have promoted
Turkey as a mediator between East and West as well as between Islam and Chris-
tian civilizations, particularly so after 9/11. The mediator role has commonly been
formulated with reference to Turkey’s “hybridity” in both its geography and its (po-
litical) history: Turkey’s location between Europe and Asia is the fundament of por-
traying Turkey as a meeting place of differing cultures and regions—as a “bridge”
between civilizations.41 Evoking Istanbul’s unique locality also reminds internal and
external audiences of the Ottoman past and its imperial grandeur and multicul-
tural heritage under a “pax-Ottomana.” Such references expose what Yanık called a
“yearning for a hybrid past,” under the label “neo-Ottomanism,” which emerged in
the early 1990s and increased in the 2000s (Yanık 2011, 84–85).
A particular reading of history influenced a renewed exceptionalism in Turkish
foreign policy under the AKP government, which in turn was fueled by a wide-
spread self-understanding as a country in transition from middle to great power
(Yanik 2011, 80). Most prominently, former foreign and prime minister Ahmet
Davutog˘lu equated Ottoman conquests with “Ottoman globalization” and declared
the Ottoman Empire a unique source of multiculturalism. In his view, the turn of
the century marked a crisis ofWestern civilization (rather than Islam). Whereas “the
Chinese and Indian civilizations could never become global,” core attributes of the
Ottoman Empire had become particularly suitable for politics in a globalizing world
(Davutog˘lu quoted in Yanık 2011, 86). Less triumphalist, President Abdullah Gül
(2007–14) habitually referred to Turkey as an “inspiration” for Middle Eastern coun-
tries.42 In this sense, “hybrid constructions of geography and history not only pave
the way for ‘exceptionalism.’ Such representations also turn exceptionalism into
a strategy of resistance and paradoxically, a claim of superiority against the ‘West’
as part of the quest to become part of the West” (Yanik 2011, 83). Accordingly,
when being tasked with forming a new government in November 2015, Davutog˘lu
(then as prime minister and head of the AKP) described one of its tasks at a press
conference as “to make a new Turkey which surpasses the level of contemporary
civilization.”43
All three elements of Turkish exceptionalism—geographic, historical, and the
relationship between the state and Islam—feed into an understanding of Turkey
as an exemplary, model—or “inspirational”—state to other Muslim and develop-
ing countries under current conditions of globalization, religious conflict, and the
rise of “new” powers. A supposedly Turkish inclination to peaceful mediation be-
tween multiple ethnicities and religions, based on the “pax-Ottomana” metaphor,
has been repeatedly quoted by Turkish leaders as a model for the pacification of in-
ternal and external conflicts in neighboring states (Saraçog˘lu and Demirkol 2015,
313–14). Likewise, as the only competitive party system in the former Ottoman lands
(Angrist 2004), the Turkish polity represented a model to others. The Turkish path
40
For the important role accrued to geography in Turkish post–Cold War security (“geographic determinism”)
discourses, see Bilgin (2005, 185–87).
41
For instance, then president Abdullah Gül in interviews with the Guardian (2008) and the Telegraph (2011).
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For instance in the Guardian (2008). We owe this and several other specifications in this section to an anonymous
reviewer.
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“Turkish PM Davutog˘lu forms 64th government of Turkey.” Hürriyet Daily News, November 24, 2015.
Accessed September 13, 2016. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-pm-davutoglu-forms-64th-government-of
turkey.aspx?PageID=238&NID=91592&NewsCatID=338.
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toward modernity coupled with recent economic successes provided further ele-
ments for the official portrayal of Turkey as an exemplary—and exceptional—state.
Exceptionalist elements have been particularly prominent in Davutog˘lu’s state-
ments as foreign minister but also informed the broader AKP government’s dis-
course around Turkey’s quest for a new role in international politics since its first
victory in parliamentary elections in 2002. For instance, in their qualitative content
analysis of Erdog˘an’s speeches as prime minister, Benhaïm and Öktem find that “it
is the overarching importance of the Ottoman Empire and the role of civilization
(read religion) that makes for Turkey’s ‘unique’ place in the world” (2015, 18). By
reiterating Turkey’s own standing, not as a Western but as a Turkic and Islamic na-
tion with an important role to play as model to other countries, Davutog˘lu and oth-
ers precipitated Ankara’s reorientation toward the Middle East as well as attempts
to strengthen ties with African countries.44 Although put in doubt given the more
recent developments in Turkish politics, traditional Turkish insistence on inclusive
multilateralism and mediation as modus operandi in global affairs, together with
the belief in its exemplary role to other nations, suggests that important segments
of the AKP’s pre-2016 understanding of Turkish exceptionalism comes closest to
our ideal type of internationalist exceptionalism.
Indeed, 2016 can be regarded as a turning point in Turkish foreign policy dis-
courses. With the limitations to Turkish regional power ambitions already apparent,
Prime Minister Davutog˘lu’s dismissal in May that year and the attempted coup in
July precipitated a “more “transactional,” unplanned, ad hoc type of foreign pol-
icy” (Dalacoura 2017, 2).45 This entails a markedly more anti-Western discourse
and less reliance on Turkey’s civilizational heritage as a mediator between East and
West, which was most visibly illustrated in the Turkish government’s tacit approval
of allegations of US involvement in the attempted military coup itself (Arango and
Yenginsu 2016). Populist nationalism, it seems, has replaced exceptionalist elements
in Turkey’s foreign policy discourse.
Comparative Exceptionalism: Types and Sources
Exceptionalism in foreign policy is and always has been more common than a read-
ing of the most prominent case, US exceptionalism, suggests. Based on a compara-
tive view—that is so far missing from the literature—on exceptionalist foreign policy
discourses in China, India, Turkey, and the United States, we argue that exception-
alism necessarily entails the conviction of superiority in moral (or spiritual) terms,
taken to be impossible to replicate by other states. Typically, this conviction is con-
veyed in discourses expressed primarily in a domestic context, not directed toward
international audiences. As such, exceptionalist discourses are part of a society’s de-
bates around its identity as a nation. The conviction of moral superiority may then
feed into several kinds of exceptionalism, which for heuristic purposes we tenta-
tively distinguish as four ideal types inspired by the four cases laid out above. The
ideal types differ with regard to denoting either an exemplary or a missionary ap-
proach to world politics. Moreover, types of exceptionalism differ with regard to
being either exemptionalist or nonexemptionalist. The fluidity of domestic foreign
policy discourses and their interrelation with reformulations of national identity in
a changing international context means that distinct exceptionalist discourses are
not static. Figure 1 illustrates the changing nature of exceptionalist discourses from
our four cases along the two axes developed in our typology.
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See, for instance, Davutog˘lu (2012). Other AKP politicians, such as Abduallah Gül, continued to locate Turkey as
part of Europe (Telegraph 2008).
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Also see a quantitative analysis of the “rise and fall of Turkey’s soft power discourse” throughout the AKP years
prior to Davutog˘lu’s departure from government (Benhaїm and Öktem 2015).
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Figure 1. Exceptionalist discourses (authors’ compilation)
As argued above, distinct exceptionalist foreign policy discourses can be located
on two continuums. First, an exceptionalist discourse that is dominant within a spe-
cific episode recognizes the binding character of international agreements to a cer-
tain degree, that is somewhere between the extremes of nonexemptionalism and
absolute exemptionalism (vertical axis). Second, a dominant discourse expresses
a missionary or an exemplary understanding of exceptionalism (horizontal axis);
again, specific discourses may exhibit both traits to varying degrees. The complexity
of exceptionalism as foreign policy discourse is illustrated by two US and three Chi-
nese discourses depicted in Figure 1: Competing variants of exceptionalism may be
prevalent at one and the same time (here Qing China in different regions); more-
over, the same country may exhibit differing types of exceptionalism at different
points in history (here the United States and China).
Future comparative research on exceptionalism should find answers to two sets
of questions on two levels of analysis. First and domestically, we should learn more
about the sources and precise manifestations of exceptionalist discourses from dif-
ferent and so far unexposed cases beyond the United States. Is there a common
cause for exceptionalist elements in foreign policy? In how far are distinct types of
exceptionalisms linked to distinct distributions of material and social power? The
enhanced visibility of and attention paid to “rising powers” in world politics makes
this question particularly relevant. Linked to the distribution of material or other
sources of power is the question, under what conditions do proponents of excep-
tionalism select from and employ history as a source and legitimator of foreign
policy behavior (and what are the prospects of such a choice)?
A second set of questions concerns the evolution of global politics in an age of
“multi-nodality.” Does the new imminence or enhanced visibility of exceptionalisms
in world politics—if found to be accurate—pose a hindrance to closer and more
peaceful cooperation between respective states?46 What type of exceptionalism fa-
vors cooperation over competition, and under what circumstances can the poten-
tially offensive traits of exceptionalism (exemptionalism in particular) be balanced
by its nonconfrontational features?
Regarding the first set of questions, can we discern why some countries adopt
exceptionalist discourses and others do not? Although a generalizable answer to
that question would call for a comparative treatment of exceptionalist and nonex-
46
Consider Tanvi Madan’s characterization of current US-India relations as a “phenomenon that one might call
India-US exceptionalism: each of the countries involved not just thinks that it is exceptional, but that the other should
make exceptions for it. Each also expects more from the other than perhaps any other of its allies or partners and
expects that, as a fellow democracy, the other should understand its constraints. Each also seems to believe that the
other does not understand its exceptionalism, leading to doubt and disappointment” (Madan 2014).
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ceptionalist cases, and the purpose of this article lies elsewhere, we may infer three
common traits found in all of the four cases. First, our presupposition that only
those countries with the ambition to play a major role in international politics are
likely to adopt exceptionalist discourses seems convincing. India in the early Nehru
years exemplifies the mismatch between ambition and material power capacities,
as does the United States in its early settlement period. In the Indian case, in fact,
Nehru explicitly justified his missionary foreign policy activism with India’s destiny
as a major power.
Second, references to the respective country’s unique civilizational heritage, and,
indeed, its self-understanding as a civilization rather than a mere nation state,
emerged as another trait shared across three of our four cases. In Turkey, for in-
stance, references to the Ottoman past typically included a romanticized version
of Turkish civilization beyond today’s state boundaries. Such references became in-
creasingly frequent after 9/11 and often included the claim that Turkey was partic-
ularly suited for mediating in Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations.47 The civilizational
aspect is also very present in the Chinese case, not least in the notion of Tianxia. By
contrast, civilizational aspects are less prominent in US discourses. This may be a
little surprising, as the very genesis of American exceptionalism relied to a consid-
erable degree on America’s difference from and superiority over (feudal) Europe.
References to a common civilizational heritage in American exceptionalism tend
to be confined to the values of the Enlightenment and, hence, to civic rather than
culturalistic arguments as in the Chinese, Indian, and Turkish cases.
Finally, all four cases exhibit a certain self-centeredness that seems to be char-
acteristic for relatively large countries. China, India, and the United States are the
world’s three most populous countries; Turkey with its seventy-nine million inhab-
itants is still among the world’s top twenty and by far the most populous country
within its immediate neighborhood. In his treatment of the Chinese strategic com-
munity, Edward Luttwak, for instance, claims what he calls a “great state autism”
(2013, 13–23). Relatively resilient regarding the (foreign and domestic) activities
of other states and preoccupied with domestic developments themselves, political
leaders in states such as China or the United States are less inclined to consider
foreign intelligence in detail (except in times of crisis) and tend to interpret inter-
national politics in categories derived from their own respective national history.48
Presumably, the low salience of foreign policy in India’s domestic discourse men-
tioned above is at least in part thanks to the country’s continental size. Relatively
marginal media treatments of foreign countries and relations, in turn, facilitate the
universalization of the particular in all four cases.
In addition to these common traits, our comparative perspective exposes the va-
riety of sources for exceptionalist discourses—from geography (Turkey), to multi-
ethnicity (India, Turkey), spiritual heritage (India, China, the United States), im-
perial past (China, Turkey), and political history or state formation (India, the
United States). From the above, can we infer anything regarding the factors con-
tributing to one or the other variant of exceptionalism? Again, the cases in this
article are merely illustrative and may therefore suggest rather than confirm what
factors best explain variation in exceptionalisms. Yet, the prominence explicitly as-
signed to multiethnicity in Indian and Turkish foreign policy discourses suggests
that it supports mediating, nonexemptional forms of exceptionalism. Recognizing
diversity as an integral aspect of a nation’s exceptionalism allows for greater com-
plexity in terms of normative principles, and it shifts the attention toward medi-
ating processes and institutions. Intense debates around the eventual incorpora-
tion of legal pluralism within a federal polity in newly independent India’s consti-
tution exposed a pronounced sensitivity toward religious, linguistic, and cultural
47
We owe this thought to an anonymous reviewer.
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See Womack on large states’ “tendency toward inattention” (2015, 204).
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differences. Arguably, Indian exceptionalism’s reference to Indians’ unique capac-
ity to synthesize religious and cultural differences fed into Nehru’s ambition to me-
diate in international conflicts as well as his support for both the UN and developing
countries’ voices within it. Likewise, in Turkish discourses, a Turkish capacity and
responsibility to mediate in Middle Eastern conflicts was derived from an image of
the Ottoman Empire as a multicultural and multireligious political entity.
By contrast, representing an ancient civilization, spiritual heritage, and/or his-
tory as an imperial or great power seems to involve more ambiguous factors, espe-
cially when it comes to our second set of questions, the “effects” of the different
types of exceptionalism. Whereas all factors mentioned above contribute to the uni-
versalization of the particular, the essence of exceptionalism, they may feed into
both missionary and exemplary as well as exemptionalist and nonexemptionalist
foreign policy discourses. This can be most prominently seen in the “missionary”
and “exemplary” strands of American exceptionalism and the debates around “iso-
lationism” and “internationalism” that continue until the present day. Furthermore,
quotes from Bai above exemplify how a “benign” (and historically inaccurate) in-
terpretation of Chinese imperial history, in combination with its supposedly supe-
rior civilization, turns into a discourse sustaining an exemplary but exemptionalist
approach to foreign relations. By contrast, Davutog˘lu and his disciples idealized
Turkey’s Ottoman heritage and may have overplayed its contemporary attraction,
yet references to the “Pax Ottomana” suggest a decidedly benign and mediating
form of exceptionalism making exemptionalism unlikely. Similarly, whereas refer-
ences to India’s pride in its ancient, multiethnic civilization fueled a missionary ap-
proach to international relations under Nehru, they also helped in portraying India
as a defender of equal rights and thus contributed to a nonexemptionalist foreign
policy discourse.
References to the relatively more recent nation state in US and Indian discourses
also exhibit ambivalence in terms of their justification of distinctive types of ex-
ceptionalism. A long tradition of foreign policy thought in the United States inter-
prets its independence and state formation as a victory of Enlightenment values in
the United States over (European) feudalism and imperialism; yet, discourses un-
derlining the uniqueness of America’s founding and its special mission as “chosen
by God” frequently contributed to a decisively exemptionalist foreign policy dis-
course, as vividly displayed under G. W. Bush. However, exemptionalism played a
much lesser role throughout the Obama years. Again as exemplified in his second
inaugural address, he emphasized that “our obligations as Americans are not just
to ourselves, but to all posterity,” which is why the United States responds to “the
threat of climate change” and “America will remain the anchor of strong alliances
in every corner of the globe” (The White House 2013). In India, the establishment
of a nation state against all odds and across a widely diverse territory, again, con-
tributed to Nehru’s missionary and nonexemptionalist foreign policy activism and
discourse. On the other hand, Indian foreign policy after Nehru tended to down-
play missionary elements in favor of a more exemplary approach—as illustrated in
India’s characteristically fervent opposition to democracy-promotion abroad.
Finally, we maintain that exceptionalism per se is neither a mere product of grow-
ing material and social power capabilities, nor is it linked to an absolute threshold
of power in world affairs. Exceptionalism itself is not a new phenomenon in “rising
states.” Against the backdrop of long histories of exceptionalist discourses in China,
India, and Turkey, actual rising power status (and status seeking) may in some cases
contribute to their revival. Arguably, the consciousness of enhanced power capabil-
ities in twenty-first century China, the United States under GW Bush, and pre-2016
Turkey intensified exceptionalist foreign policy discourses. However, external at-
tributions of status in global politics may also effectively undermine exceptionalist
elements in foreign policy discourses. In India, a growing understanding of inter-
national interdependence on behalf of the foreign-policy-making elite has made
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exceptionalist elements, such as an orthodox understanding of nonalignment,
more difficult to uphold. Adopting a position in global politics that is more in
line with India’s ambitious aspirations has made New Delhi more susceptible to
accepting the unexceptional nature of this position. Thus, exceptionalism draws on
a history of discourses with origins in times in which great power status was merely
aspirational, rather than real. Ostensibly, enhanced material and social power may
then work both ways: by intensifying and undermining exceptionalist foreign policy
discourses.
However, at least when looking at more contemporary developments, a relative
superiority in the capacity to project material and social power globally seems to coin-
cide with exemptionalist forms of exceptionalism, in both the missionary and exem-
plary combination. Exemptionalist and exemplary discourse (“civilizational excep-
tionalism”) has become prominent in Chinese foreign policy in the wake of what
is characterized as China’s rise to global power status, second only to the United
States. “Imperialist exceptionalism” was a major component of foreign policy dis-
courses throughout the G. W. Bush years and is considered today as the epilogue
to the “unipolar moment” of the 1990s (cf. Wohlforth 1999). In contrast, Nehru’s
nonexemptionalist foreign policy activism may have overestimated the power of
diplomacy but was keenly aware of India’s limitations in terms of economic devel-
opment and military capabilities. And despite Turkey’s economic boom, growing
diplomatic outreach, and political attraction in the AKP years before 2016, Ankara’s
understanding of its relative position vis-à-vis global powers such as the United States
and China remained largely unchanged. For instance, since 2013, Turkey is a mem-
ber of the MIKTA, a consultative forum also including the (partially self-declared)
middle-powers Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, and Australia.
Conclusion and Outlook
Our findings expose that exceptionalism is neither exclusive to the United States
nor is it necessarily confrontational, exemptionalist, or a natural feature of great
or rising powers, as suggested by the prevalent IR literature on US (and partly Chi-
nese) exceptionalism. Whether (historically) justified or not, discourses in China,
India, and Turkey tend to underline their respective exceptionalist foreign policies’
mediating characteristics. When compared to states without exceptionalist foreign
policy discourses, nonexemptionalist types of exceptionalism are potentially making
international negotiations more cumbersome. Nevertheless, they are peaceful in
character. Nonexemptionalist types of exceptionalism’s reference to general moral
sentiments, from peace to equality and dialogue, may in fact contribute to greater
cooperation in those fields of global governance desperately in need of common
solutions. By contrast, imperialist exceptionalism, with its missionary and exemp-
tionalist traits, is the most conflict prone combination—but it seems by no means
to be the most prevalent form of exceptionalism. Even exemptionalist types in their
exemplary form of civilizational exceptionalism are not necessarily confrontational.
On the contrary, they may stand for an isolationist foreign policy, which however
also inhibits cooperation.
In future research, our distinction between imperialist, civilizational, internation-
alist, and globalist exceptionalism will be instrumental for a more detailed compar-
ative analysis of exceptionalisms in foreign policy than provided in this article.49
Such analyses ought to pay attention to the historical dimension in two ways. First,
different types of exceptionalism may be prevalent in a given country at the same
time, and throughout different phases of its history. Our typology will be helpful in
categorizing, comparing, and visualizing the varieties of exceptionalisms across time
49
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be desirable. South Africa, Ethiopia, or Brazil come to mind.
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and world regions. A closer inspection of exceptionalist discourses must also shed
more light on the important question as to under what circumstances what type
of exceptionalism possibly emerges. In other words, does exceptionalism—no mat-
ter how nonexemptionalist it is at one point in time—necessarily come along with
a tendency toward exemptionalism and, thus, the conflict prone characteristics of
the imperialist type? How resilient are benign forms of exceptionalism? Second,
all exceptionalist foreign policy discourses rely on particular readings of (national)
history. Clearly, the interpretation of history remains a key ingredient of foreign
policy discourses across the world and, particularly so, within “rising” or “aspiring”
powers. The structural differences and commonalities in the politicization of his-
tory through foreign policy discourses can only be revealed through a comparative
enquiry, thus—also here—exposing the universal within the particular.
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